European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply by Jonas Tallberg

Author:Jonas Tallberg [Tallberg, Jonas]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Public Policy, Political Science, Law Enforcement, Economic Policy, Law, General
ISBN: 9781134386161
Google: W65hC7uoxTQC
Goodreads: 18150128
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2003-06-12T00:00:00+00:00

The post-IGC game: stripping the proposal of contentious elements

Though unmistakably a failure, the conclusion of the IGC still left hope for the future. At Amsterdam, the Commission had managed to get a “hook” into the European Council conclusions, which opened the door to future supranational proposals in this area:

The European Council underlines the crucial importance of timely and correct transposition of all agreed legislation into national law, the need fully to inform citizens and business about the Single Market, and the necessity of active enforcement of Community law in the Member States and the introduction of more rapid and effective procedures for problem-solving including deliberations at Council level in cases of recurring problems. The European Council requests the Commission to examine ways and means of guaranteeing in an effective manner the free movement of goods. It requests the Commission to submit relevant proposals before its next meeting in December 1997.

(European Council 1997: 11-12)

This hook provided the Commission with an opportunity to revise its proposal and present it anew to member governments in a format more likely to be accepted (interviews, Commission officials, December 15, 1997 and February 3, 1998). The practice of using summit conclusions as a launching pad for Commission proposals was nothing original, but a common Commission tactic. As one senior Commission official, cited by John Peterson, has asserted: “[Summit declarations] give you a knock out blow in negotiations. If you can cite a European Council conclusion in a debate you’re away” (Peterson 1995: 72). In this case, it permitted the Commission to develop a proposal for a regulation during the fall of 1997.

When the Internal Market Council met for an informal meeting in Echternach, Luxembourg, at the beginning of October 1997, Commissioner Mario Monti recalled the Amsterdam mandate and declared his intention to present a legislative proposal for means to rapidly correct internal market violations (internal Commission memo, October 10, 1997). At the meeting, the governments of Italy, Spain, and Portugal were, not surprisingly, quick to support this initiative. On November 18, the full Commission adopted the proposal for a Council regulation (European Commission 1997f; see also 1997g, 1998c: iv; European Voice November 6-12, 1997: 1). The regulation would endow the Commission with special powers in cases involving serious obstacles to the free movement of goods. The Commission would be permitted to request, through a binding decision, member states to remove such obstacles within a particular time period, after which it could rapidly seize the ECJ through an accelerated infringement procedure. While still an appeal for new substantive enforcement powers, the proposal was nevertheless a shadow of its former self. Drafted on the philosophy that “a limited proposal is more likely to be accepted by the member states” (interview, Commission official, February 3, 1998), this version excluded the most contentious elements of the Commission-inspired Italian and Spanish proposals presented at the IGC.

The reception of the proposal was mixed. When member governments were given the opportunity to react at the Internal Market Council in late November, their general

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